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were collected using non-participant observations, shadowing and interviews. Approximately 360 hours of
observations and 38 interviews were conducted by the team. Observation ﬁeld notes from each pharmacy
were written into case studies. Overall, 52,500 words from 15 case studies and interview transcripts were
analyzed using thematic and line-by-line analyses. Validation techniques included multiple data collectors
co-authoring each case study for consensus, review of case studies by members of the wider team including
academic and practicing community pharmacists, and patient safety experts and two presentations
(internally and externally) to review and discuss ﬁndings.
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217Harvey et al. / Research in Social and Administrative Pharmacy 11 (2015) 216–227Conclusions: To identify and evaluate risks eﬀectively, an approach that includes understanding relation-
ships between key components in dispensing is required. Since teams of people in community pharmacies
are a key dispensing component, and therefore part of the operational process, it is important to note how
they relate to other components in the environment within which they operate. Pharmacies can take the
opportunity to reﬂect on the organization of their systems and review in particular how they can improve
on the four key categories identiﬁed.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Previous studies1,2 have depicted the community
pharmacy as an organization where networks of
people, technical and other components in the envi-
ronment come together to achieve a shared objec-
tive: dispense safely to patients. To achieve safe
dispensing, pharmacy managers engage in safety
practices that are part of a safety system. A safety
system reﬂects the organization’s commitment to
safety and is a key ingredient in employees’ percep-
tions about the importanceof safety.3,4 In a commu-
nity pharmacy, a safety system may include a set of
values about safety,5 employees’ safety behavior,6–8
protocols and operational rules,1,9 preventative
planning such as identifying and evaluating
risk,3,4,10,11 and root cause incident analysis for
organizational learning.12,13 In this article, ‘risk’ is
used to depict ‘acts or conditions’ that inﬂuence
how safety is practice and achieved.
Therefore, the networks of people and their
attitudes, organizational factors aﬀecting them and
environments within which they operate are all
components that should be considered when iden-
tifying and evaluating risk as part of a safety
system.11,14,15 According to Reason’s Swiss Cheese
model,16 these components can be organized into
ﬁve “layers”:
1. Decision-makers: the strategic decision-making
that determines what staﬀ will do and how;
2. Line management: the implementation of stra-
tegic decisions by directing work activities;
3. Preconditions: the prerequisites for successful
work activity activities to be successful (for
example equipment, training and procedures);
4. Work activities: the behaviors that are carried
out;
5. Defenses: the safeguards put in place to protect
people and equipment fromhazards associated
with the work activities.
Reason proposed that any or all of these layers
could in practice have weaknesses of some kind. Ingeneral terms, “latent conditions” are weaknesses
that aﬀect the ﬁrst three layers (for example, ﬂawed
decisions by managers) and “active failures” are
those aﬀecting work activities (for example, unsafe
acts by workers). Defenses, meanwhile, can be
aﬀected by either type of weakness. The eﬀect of
latent conditions and active failures is to render the
work system vulnerable to hazards; the more
hazards are allowed into the system, and the further
they are allowed to promulgate through it, the
more likely that an accident will ultimately occur.
Hence, organizational safety can be seen as a
matter of ensuring that the components that are
present within the organization (and, more specif-
ically, those that are implicated in particular tasks)
are made as robust as possible. The aim of this
study was to examine the activities that take place
in community pharmacy dispensing, and to iden-
tify the ways in which organizational components
either contribute to or reduce safety.Methods
Methodological framework
Quantitative studies tend to focus on objective
abstractions such as metrics and scores that do not
always capture the nuances embedded in daily
practices.17 While such studies provide generalized
information than can be translated into protocols,
they sometimesoverlook shiftingordynamichuman
factors that are needed to understand subtle pro-
cesses in daily practices. To understand how
diﬀerent components interact in dispensing and
identify risk issues implicated in them, this study
adopted the qualitative approach of socio-
technical or ‘socio-material’ paradigms. Socio-
material paradigms are used to study networks of
people and their relationships with other
components in an environment.18–21 A common
theme in these paradigms is their focus on studying
both tangible (e.g. materials) and intangible (e.g.
relationship) components of systems; such as
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certain practices into their daily routines. The appli-
cationof suchparadigms in research followsqualita-
tive multi-method approaches. In pharmacy
speciﬁcally, these paradigms have been used to char-
acterize work practice in terms of safety cultures
from human and organizational perspectives.6,22
Various studies demonstrate how the study of
work practice can be approached in regard to data
collection and analysis.23,24 Harrison et al, for
example, used this approach to study networks of
people and their attitudes, organizational factors
aﬀecting them and environments within which they
operate in health care information technology sys-
tems. Using this approach Harrison showed how it
was necessary tounderstandkey interactions among
the components such as the people who use the
systems, their workﬂows, culture, social interac-
tions, and technologies when studying health care
IT systems.23 However, since these paradigms do
not speciﬁcally focus on risk, the study also drew
on concepts of risk contributors in and outside of
clinical practice.11,14,25–27 From this background
literature, the study team identiﬁed the key topics
for examination in the study as people and their at-
titudes, physical environments, management struc-
ture and ethos, workload and workﬂow, technical
systems; and, the processes and interactions that
bind them in practice.Data collection
The study protocol was submitted to the Cam-
bridgeshire NHSResearch Ethics Committee (REF
08/H0304158) and was classed as a service evalua-
tion. NHS Research and Development approvals
were obtained prior to conducting data collection at
the various study sites. The research described in the
current paper was part of a larger study to investi-
gate the impact of the national Electronic Prescrip-
tion Service Release Two (EPS2) on general
practices, community pharmacies, patients and
business stakeholders.28 The sites sampled were all
located in theMidlands andNorthern regions ofEn-
gland. Six were independent pharmacies, and nine
were chains consisting of local and national chains.
Descriptive details of the pharmacies are published
elsewhere.29 Data were collected from December
2009 to September 2011. Pre-EPS2 implementation
data were collected from 15 pharmacies (2009–11),
and post-EPS2 implementation data were collected
from eight of these 15 pharmacies (2011). Seven of
the pre-implementation sites did not go on to adopt
EPS2 at the time of the study. The study wasdesigned by a team of sociologists, patient safety
and pharmacy practice experts. Data were primarily
collected by JH, who is an experienced qualitative
social scientist with health research experience. JH
was helped on occasions by other researchers within
the team, including SS (pharmacist), JD (pharmacist
and doctoral candidate), RH (e-health expert),
and JW (sociologist) with informal observations
from MB (practicing and academic community
pharmacist). Ethnographically-informed methods
– non-participant observations, shadowing, and in-
depth interviews – were used to collect data.
Non-participant observations
Observations were used as an unobtrusive
method to enable the observation of dispensing
without interfering with the process. Key issues
considered in the observation included:
 The physical environment.
 The management and their ethos toward
innovation.
 The ﬂuidity of the dispensing processes from
when the prescription arrived in the pharmacy
to when it was dispensed (bagged for collec-
tion or handed to the customer) for both acute
and repeat prescriptions.
 The types and amount of dispensing conducted,
hours of work, and types of services oﬀered.
 The number of staﬀ present at the time of
observation, ranging from the counter assis-
tant to the responsible pharmacist.
 The location and availability of material
resources such as printers, computers, secured
storage for controlled drugs, logging books for
controlled drugs and pharmacy management
software.
 How the electronic aspect of dispensing was
engaged with, and the use of protocols and
procedures while dispensing.
 The way staﬀ interacted with each other and
with patients/customers during dispensing.
 Attitudes toward risk and violations in context
of all the above.
Observations were carried out using a ﬁeld-
work guide (Fig. 1), and consisted of two-three
day visit to each site. All researchers reﬂected on
the data collection process in a written form, after
the data collection (Fig. 1).
Shadowing
Shadowing is a technique used in social sci-
ences and user experience research. It comprises
Fig. 1. Fieldwork guide (template).
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system as they use it. It is similar to a non-
participant observation; however, unlike observa-
tions, the user is encouraged to speak their
thoughts out loud while using the system:
“Throughout the shadowing period the researcher
asks questions which will prompt a running
commentary from the person being shadowed.”30
Shadowing enables the researcher to see the sys-
tem from the user’s perspective. Due to the busy
nature of pharmacies and the need for the
researchers to position themselves to minimize
interference to the clinical processes, the use of
shadowing was limited. It was conducted during
the beginning of the observation period when
the researchers were being briefed on the phar-
macy procedures at the beginning of the working
day. For example, shadowing was used to record
descriptive information about the pharmacies
such as the types and amount of dispensing con-
ducted before observing it in practice. It was
also used to recorded ﬁeld notes where the phar-
macist or dispenser could not give an interview,
but was able to talk in between dispensing tasks.
Shadowing helped the researchers notice the sub-
tle diﬀerences in the described formal procedures
and adapted procedures in the routines of workpractice. Data collected from this were analyzed
together with observation data and informed the
writing up the case studies.
Interviews
Interviews were conducted to follow-up issues
highlighted during shadowing and observation and
to generally debrief pharmacists on data collection
process. The interview questions were semi-
structured and were based on themes in the
ﬁeldwork guide (Fig. 1), in addition to any other
observations made. The responsible pharmacist in
each pharmacy was interviewed in the pre- and
post- data collection, and any dispensers that
were available. Where the staﬀ were too busy to
give interviews, notes were taken and analyzed as
short transcripts together with other ﬁeld notes
for each case study. In some cases, the responsible
pharmacist was the same person in both the pre-
and post-implementation interviews; in other cases,
they were diﬀerent people. Overall, 28 interviews
were conducted in the pre-implementation study
and 10 interviews in the post-implementation
study. The interviews ranged from 10 to 45minutes
depending on how much time was available to the
pharmacist or dispenser. All 38 interviews were ra-
dio recorded, and were transcribed verbatim.
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Each observation was written into a case study
averaging 3500 words. All case studies were co-
written by the data collectors taking into account
researchers’ reﬂexivity. The case reports were then
circulated to the wider team for comments in a
draft form, and then ﬁnalized after receiving
comments from members of the team. As part of
project’s protocol to provide formative feedback
to implementer teams, ﬁndings were sent to NHS
informatics leads for comments. Overall, 52500
words in the case studies were analyzed using
cross-case thematic analysis based on the obser-
vation themes. A cross-case thematic analysis
essentially analyzes commonalities and diﬀerences
between cases studies, and within themes in the
case studies.31,32 For this paper, additional anal-
ysis was conducted using a thematic framework
approach by speciﬁcally looking at how latent
conditions and active failures were implicated in
the dispensing journeys in each case (and related
ﬁeld recordings). Interviews were analyzed using
a combination of thematic and line-by-line anal-
ysis to draw out key themes. In addition to these,
two presentations were conducted to debate and
review the ﬁndings. The ﬁrst presentation was
given at the School of Pharmacy, University of
Nottingham and had diﬀerent types of pharma-
cist, patient safety and e-health innovation experts
present. The second presentation was given at the
School of Pharmacy, University of Manchester
included group of pharmacists and patient safety
researchers. Findings from all three methods
were cross-validated with each other and synthe-
sized to identify themes that had safety implica-
tions running through them.
Results
From the 15 case studies, all the community
pharmacies used Patient Medication Record
(PMR) systems to dispense, which are provided
by commercial software vendors. Diﬀerent
vendors supply their own PMRs. Pharmacists in
the 15 case studies used a variety of PMR systems
to dispense under diﬀerent services such as ‘wait-
in’ and ‘call-backs’ (described in Table 1). During
dispensing, these diﬀerent services were prioritized
using arrangements like color baskets, and queuing
items on counter tops. In one pharmacy, a robot
was used. The average number of items dispensed
per month ranged from 2000 to 26000 (the
most items being dispensed in a robot-assisted
pharmacy).Overall, ﬁndings showed dispensing as a com-
plex practice that relied on key components such
as varied teams of people, dispensing processes,
workloads, dispensing protocols, pharmacy re-
sources, organizational systems, technologies and
physical space to dispense a prescription (Fig. 2).
These components are inextricably linked and as
a result, it was diﬃcult to identify whether a po-
tential source of risk was a result of people’s
unsafe acts or from organizational (latent) condi-
tions. What was clear, however, was that when re-
lationships between the people component and
other components were cohesive, steps involved
in prescription dispensing journeys were clear
and were operated to a high standard as this
typical dispensing journey in Case 05 shows,
recorded by JH:
1. Counter Assistant (CA) receives prescription,
and places it in its relevant color basket.
2. CA then calls out the prescription (e.g. “we
have a wait-in,” or, “we have a call-back”)
and then queues the basket for processing ac-
cording to its priority. ‘Wait-ins’ are placed
immediately next to the computer terminal
for the attention of the pharmacist.
3. Dispenser picks up the basket with the pre-
scription, and walks around to locate medi-
cine and pick from shelf (if it is a popular
medicine) or checks the computer to see if it
is in stock before picking from shelf.
4. Dispenser places medicines in basket and
queues (according to priority) for pharmacist
to professionally check.
5. Pharmacist checks, labels, packages, and
hands over to customer. Call-backs are usu-
ally prepared and queued, so that the phar-
macist would check and dispense when the
customer calls back.
Across the 15 case studies, dispensing journeys
were clear, smooth and ordered in most cases.
There were, however, instances where people did
not engage well with the other components. This
included people not organizing dispensing pro-
cesses properly due to unclear communication
protocols, people ﬁnding it hard to move around
due to lack of physical space, people ﬁnding it
hard to cope with workload and multitasking,
people’s lack of technical know-how on computer
system malfunctions, people engaging in unsafe
acts due to lack of a management structure, and
people having to manage risk from external
sources such as prescriber mistakes. Since the
‘teams of people’ were inextricably linked to
Table 1
Examples of services oﬀered by community pharmacies
Examples of type of dispensing
service oﬀered
Description
Walk-in Customers who walk in into the pharmacy to use it services such as buy Over
The Counter (OTC) medicine, hand in a prescription, or pick-up a
dispensed item. Walk-in customers fell into two categories, those who
preferred to wait-in for their medicines to be dispensed, and those who
preferred to hand in their prescription and call-back to pick-up the
dispensed medicines later. A call-back may take anything from 15 min from
after the prescription is received by the pharmacy to a few days, or until the
customer comes to collect. For the purposes of this paper: a wait-in is used
to describe those who wait-in the pharmacy for the prescription to be
dispensed, a call-back denotes those who return after 15 min (or the same
day) to collect after running other errands in the area, and pick-ups denotes
those who collect their dispensed prescriptions after one day. A walk-in
may also be delivered to the customer after dispensing.
Batch/Bulk repeat Denotes repeat prescriptions collected from general practices in batches and
dispensed. After dispensing, some of these were stored for the customer to
pick up. Others were delivered to the customer. Some were urgent and
needed to be dispensed and delivered the same day.
Care home medications (or cassettes) Are containers that separate the medicines into diﬀerent compartments
depending on when they are to be taken (day/time); they are generated from
repeat prescriptions for customers who might have problems taking the
correct dosage, and were therefore processed and dispensed separately.
Medicines Use Review (MUR) A reimbursed service, were conducted by the pharmacist and included
checking patient satisfaction with a drug they have been repeatedly
prescribed after a long duration. MUR is useful for those on repeat
prescription managed by the pharmacy as the patient does not see their
physician regularly.
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with the people component had a direct eﬀect on
all other components, and sometimes snowballed
into a challenging dispensing process. Four broad
categories that emerged, and which demonstrate
the interdependency of unsafe acts and latent
conditions, are:
1. Dispensing with divided attention: this includes
latent conditions such as relaxed management
enabling people to indulge in unsafe acts such
as dividing their attention between social
interaction and dispensing; unsafe acts such
as how clutter in the pharmacy created a diﬃ-
cult spatial condition for physical movement,
forcing staﬀ’s attention to be divided between
dispensing tasks and be constantly mindful of
where they are stepping.
2. Dispensing under pressure: through latent
conditions such as heavy workload or through
sharing equipment, people were pressured and
didnot interact eﬀectivelywith the systemwhich
resulted in unsafe acts such as not taking time to
check medications properly. Through unsafe
acts such as lack of communication, staﬀ didnot always communicatewhen they temporarily
altered procedures; this generated challenging
latent condition such as dispensing with
confused procedures which put staﬀ under pres-
sure to keep on top of tasks.
3. Dispensing in restricted spaces: unsafe acts
such not clearing away clutter in pharmacy
or through latent conditions such as small
physical dispensing space, were challenging
to how people related to the restricted spaces
while dispensing in terms of space for orga-
nizing work, physical movement and storing
medicines.
4. External influences: unsafe acts from external
sources such as general practices could poten-
tially exacerbate errors within the pharmacy
as errors from external sources might not be
part of the pharmacy’s (organization’s) safety
practice and so could be overlooked.
In the following sections, examples are given on
some of the safety implications identiﬁed citing
instances of people’s unsafe acts and organizational
conditions, using observation case studies, ﬁeld
recordings, and interview excerpts. It should be
Fig. 2. Observed system of dispensing in community pharmacies.
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identiﬁed apotential risk, henceonly the themes that
showed risk issuesandother ‘emergent’ themes from
the analysis are discussed in the article.People and their approaches to work
Responsibilities for dispensing prescriptions
were varied and depended on the environment.
The number of staﬀ in the pharmacy inﬂuenced the
distribution of tasks. Diﬀerent pharmacies had
diﬀerent workloads. Staﬀ dispensed under pressure
when there was not suﬃcient and appropriate
number of staﬀ for the workload. Walk-ins were
especially demanding as the patient could not be
left waiting in the pharmacy without immediate
attention.From interviewing the pharmacist in case
01, it transpired that although around 30% are
walk-ins and approximately 70% are deliveries, the
walk-ins took precedence, and this upset the work-
ﬂow. Also, the walk-ins took a large proportion of
the dispensing time in relation to the deliveries, even
though the latter were the biggest source of the
dispensing income in that pharmacy. In general,
pharmacy staﬀ appeared rushed and harassed if
they had a high number of walk-ins, particularly
when they were also trying to deal with other types
of dispensing such as bulk repeat collection and
delivery, care home medications and MURs.
Commonly, up to four people handled a prescrip-
tion during its dispensing journey. There were,
however, cases when the responsible pharmacist
dispensed prescriptions alone and this meant that
they were often dispensing under pressure and withdivided attention. There was disruption in the
dispensing journey when the pharmacist was solely
in charge of dispensing, as often, the pharmacist
was needed for other tasks. For example, case 08 is
a supermarket pharmacy. There were three
diﬀerent temporary agency recruited pharmacists
(called ‘locums’ in the UK) during the observation
period, each locum running a shift on diﬀerent
days. On 19/07/2010, JH recorded:
10.58. Locum is left alone at pharmacy.
Customer is at the counter, and so he goes to
see to them. Phone is ringing but locum is busy.
He has left the FP10 (prescription he is process-
ing). The phone has stopped ringing just before
he ﬁnished serving the customer. He goes back to
dispensing the FP10. It is now 11.00.
11.00. A customer is at the counter. Locum stops
dispensing to see to customer. Customer hands
over FP10 but keeps chatting to the locum
despite him [locum] showing his desperation to
go. Customer now leaves (for a call-back).
Another customer immediately walks in and
asks for something. This has taken locum to a
diﬀerent area (looking through records). The
dispensing still waits. 11.04. A new customer
walks in with two FP10s. There are now a few
customers waiting and only the locum. He is
trying not to get stressed.
[Note to self: bring this issue up in the follow up
interview].
11.08. Phone rings again. [Locum runs by me
(JH) and says I can’t split myself into two].
Locum now stressed.
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customers waiting. Problem is exacerbated by
each customer wanting a chat and asking ques-
tions. Locum very patient and tries to give each
customer all the time they demand.
11.15. There now three customers but other items
on the FP10s are dispensed. Call-back lady at
11.00 now comes to collect. It is 11.15.
Dispenser now arrives from breakfast break.
Work is now shared but there is now a queue
of FP10s. Problem with medication as they may
not have some in stock. Customer from 11.15
comes back at 11.35 only to be told that item
(medicine) is not in stock.
In cases of multiple handlers, prescriptions were
dispensed faster according to our timed recordings
of when prescriptions arrived at the pharmacy to
when they were dispensed. This, however, relied on
clear communication protocols between the
dispensing staﬀ. Without clear protocols, the phar-
macist sometimes would not prioritize an ‘urgent’
wait-in item for professional checking because they
were unaware that the ‘urgent’ item was waiting as
it had not been placed in the designated basket or
location for “urgents.”
Management structures
In terms of management and ethos of the
pharmacies, within the immediate vicinity of the
pharmacy, the pharmacist was responsible for over-
all dispensing decision-making. In instances where
the responsible pharmacist could not be located or
was occupied with a task such as MUR, dispensing
halted until the pharmacist came back and then they
sometimes rushed to performﬁnal checks quickly to
make up for lost time, resulting in checking medi-
cations under pressure. In terms of organizational
and management structures, staﬀ in chain pharma-
cies felt they had less autonomy and only had
passive input to the organization’s strategic goals
concerning meeting operational targets such as
delivery ofMURs, recruiting patients’ into a repeat
management system, and maximizing monthly
numbers of dispensed items. They felt that being
on the constant lookout for events that might count
toward targets set by the organization distracted
their attention from immediate dispensing tasks.
Case 09 shows an excerpt from interview conducted
by JH on 19/07/2011. In this example, the pharma-
cist is talking about howmeeting the 2011/12annual
maximum delivery of 300 MURs takes away con-
centration from immediate dispensing tasks such as
patient care.It is conﬂicting, because you care about your
patients and you think it’s not about targets. Like
the old lady that came in and she was talking
about her painkillers when she has a headache. I
noted that down, I could use that as an MUR in
the sense that I did sort of tell her that she’s not
supposed to be taking them all the time. It’s good
that you can use it, because it’s exactly what it is,
you are telling the patient how to use them and
advising them about it. Those are the little things
that I have to concentrate on and pick up on to
meet my targets.The physical environment
The availability of physical space in which to
carry out work inﬂuenced dispensing journeys in
terms of safety. Space for physical movement,
storage and processing medicines aided the ﬂuidity
of the dispensing process. In sites that had limited
space, dispensing appeared chaotic as staﬀ bumped
into each other whilst going about tasks, or could
not queue items on counter tops for processing and
sometimes piled items into basket; the baskets were
then piled on top of each other. Medicines were
sometimes stored in cardboard boxes on the ﬂoor
where shelves were full. Cases 03, 04, 08, and 13
were particularly lacking in space. In some cases,
the physical space was restricted due to clutter and
lack of organizationwithin the pharmacy as inCase
03. InCase 04 however, the restricted spacewas due
the small area designated for dispensing; JH
recorded the following:
The small space means that sometimes medicines
in baskets waiting to be veriﬁed are piled on top
of each other or are placed very close together.
One medicine could easily fall into another bas-
ket and if pharmacy manager is verifying the
basket’s contents with divided attention, this
could be a source of risk. Leaving medicines in
boxes on the ﬂoor due to lack of space does not
provide a clear view of each medicine. One
medicine could easily be mistaken for another.
The storage of large number of dispensed med-
icines in boxes on the ﬂoor for the delivery driver
could be another potential source of risk. These
medicines are placed directly in an unmarked
boxed and could easily be mistaken for new boxes
of medicines (except for the labels on them).Engagement with technologies
Generally, staﬀ felt that pharmacy technologies
were useful and eﬀective in managing dispensing.
Sometimes, however, there were malfunctions in
the computer systems, and pharmacists had to rely
224 Harvey et al. / Research in Social and Administrative Pharmacy 11 (2015) 216–227on the vendors to resolve these issues. In terms of
safety, some pharmacists had to dispense without
the means of checking prescriptions against patient
records. For example, in case 07, JH recorded on
08/06/2010:
The system has been down for about 15 minutes
and so a customer’s prescription was dispensed
without assistance from the computer. The phar-
macist has been on the phone twice to complain
and it is currently being seen to.
Sometimes staﬀ had to share equipment which
caused jostling between them. The unbalanced
ratio of people to equipment put staﬀ under
pressure to carry out tasks quickly with little
time for comprehensive safety checks. For example
in case 05 JH recorded on 08/04/2010:
11.11. While staﬀ uses computer, another staﬀ
drums her ﬁngers on the counter waiting to use
the terminal. She (ﬁrst staﬀ) jokes “No pressure”
while a third staﬀ waits.Attitudes toward safety
The attitudes and motivation of staﬀ toward
safety while dispensing appeared to vary. The
pharmacies had designated protocols, but some
staﬀ were less strict in their application of these
protocols than others. For example, nine of the
sites used color baskets to prioritize dispensing.
They did this in terms of urgency of walk-in
prescriptions (e.g. red basket ¼ wait-in, gray
basket ¼ call-back), or to denote the
prescription’s ﬁnal destination for prescriptions
that are dispensed in bulk and delivered to the
patient (e.g. blue basket ¼ Alpha’s surgery, Yel-
low basket ¼ Zulu’s care home). Three pharma-
cies had no clear system and took to queuing
prescriptions and items on the counter top. Safety
implications were identiﬁed in cases where
protocols were not followed and procedures
violated. For example in case 06, JH recorded
on 22/04/2010:
There are color baskets red, white and blue which
are supposed to be used to organized dispensing,
but I have just been informed that this procedure
is not usually followed.
There were also procedure violations in rela-
tion to labeling. Labels were sometimes printed oﬀ
long before the medicine was processed and
dispensed. These labels were pinned onto the
edge of counter tops or other surfaces until they
were needed, thereby increasing the risk of label-
ing medicines with the wrong labels.Social activities were sometimes incorporated
into work such as personal telephone calls, con-
versations between staﬀ about non-dispensing
issues and other non-work-related activities such
as going on the Internet to check personal emails.
Some listened to the radio, and staﬀ in one
pharmacy watched television. Some social activ-
ities were used to project a family atmosphere to
propel work and inﬂuenced how dispensing was
approached. It must be noted that social activities
and violations observed in the pharmacies are a
snapshot of two-three day observations and may
not be prevalent in the long-term or in all
pharmacies. In case 06, for example, JH recorded
on 26.04.2010:
Viewing television seems to be part of work
culture. From about 9.15 to noon, the staﬀ was
viewing television whilst dispensing medicines.
During the television viewing period, attention of
the staﬀ was very distracted. JH recorded: 9.18.
There is a television playing on the dispensing
counter. At a later time (time not recorded), JH
added: There is constant attention on the TV. At
one point a customer was left waiting as Counter
Assistant (CA) was occupied watching TV. She
(CA) has been reminded that a customer was
waiting. The television was ﬁrmly stationed on
the front counter and appeared to be part of the
pharmacy’s hardware. To conﬁrm this, a
researcher collecting data for a diﬀerent work
stream of this project reported watching televi-
sion (during his lunch break) at this pharmacy.
It should be noted that in other areas this
pharmacy also demonstrated a positive work
practice. For example, the temporary pharmacist
(locum) strictly followed procedures when
dispensing controlled drugs by supervising the
patient when they took the medication and then
logging it on a report form before going back to
dispense other medications.
Other factors: Prescriber inﬂuences
Prescribers’ instructions were sometimes not
clear, or on occasions change their mind about a
prescription, and required the pharmacist to
intervene. This sometimes meant the pharmacist
had to be on a special lookout for a speciﬁc
patient in addition to their duties and worked with
divided attention. In case 07, on 10/06/2010 JH
recorded:
11.24: There has just been a phone call from GP
who asked if a ‘Joe Bloggs’ has been in. After the
call, the pharmacist informed me that the GP had
prescribed acute antibiotic but had changed their
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local, the doctor called the pharmacy to ask if the
medicine could be stopped when the patient
comes in. The patient could however choose to
go somewhere in which the medicine would not
be stopped.Discussion
Key message from the study
Since potential sources of risks identiﬁed were
linked to people’s relationships with other key
components in the system, the ﬁndings suggest
that the method by which people interact and
engage with other components in dispensing is the
key contributor to risk. Similar to other relevant
studies, components identiﬁed as potential sources
of risk included sources of distraction which
might lead to unsafe acts such as action slips
and memory lapses; violations, or latent (organi-
zational) conditions such as heavy workloads,
inadequate knowledge, a stressful environment,
or inadequate systems of communication.3,11,14
The four categories that emerged from the
analysis show that safety management must
address various components that make up
dispensing and the relationships that bind them in
operation.Human beings inworking environments
cannot completely avoid making errors. However,
unsafe acts or unfavorable latent conditions could
be addressed through the creation of better re-
lationships between key components in practice.
Community pharmacies are complex places of
work because the pharmacy is essentially a business
providing health care services.33 However,
although the community pharmacy is a health
care service provider, the pharmacist is usually
the only trained clinician as support staﬀ are gener-
ally non-clinical unlike clinically trained general
practice (GP) nurses or dental nurses.Nevertheless,
dispensing involves complex team work of clinical
processes such as diﬀerentiating between similar
medications, processing the correct dosage and
monitoring patients, all of which are delivered un-
der complex arrangements such as wait-ins, call-
backs, MURs and care home medications. Staﬀ,
therefore, need to relate well to other components
that are involved in dispensing under these complex
arrangements such as communication protocols,
workload, workﬂow, physical environment, man-
agement and organizational structure. It has been
found that when employees work with high work-
loads or under time pressure, their rate of error in-
creases due to violations, cognitive lapses and thegeneral stress.8,34–38 Additionally, the physical
work environment can have a key role in safe prac-
tices.39 While the increasing adoption of advanced
IT systems, and other safeguards appears to have
shifted focus away from the role of people in safety
systems, it is the people who have to operate the IT
and the safeguards in the ﬁrst place, andmust there-
fore relate to them favorably. A key message from
this study is that in a complex environment such
as the community pharmacy, the relationships
and interactions between human and other compo-
nents should be taken into consideration when
developing a safety system.
Adopting research into practice
Whilst pharmacies may not be considered as
‘high risk’ environments compared to, for
example, the aviation industry, they could beneﬁt
from adopting an approach where the networks of
people, and how they relate with other compo-
nents in dispensing, are focused on practice and
policy. An example of a way these research
ﬁndings can be adopted into practice and policy
is to improve the relationships and interactions
between key contributors to dispensing through
the creation of ‘standard dynamic’ environments.
Standard dynamic environments are environments
with unique identities, but where key interactions
and relationships are similar, thereby enabling
shared values and seamless transitions from one
pharmacy to the other without the cognitive
challenge of learning a new safety system. Stan-
dard dynamic environments would be where there
is a core ‘standard’ system of what constitutes best
practice through the amalgamation of new and
existing protocols such as Standard Operating
Protocols (SOPs), pharmacy design guidelines
and other standardized procedures and guide-
lines,1,9,40 and which people could make dynamic
by adapting it to suit the changing environment.
Pharmacies could then consider (and potentially
justify) the extent to which they have deviated
from the core standard system as part of their
safety practice for industry regulators.
Strengths and limitations of the study
Using observations to study community phar-
macy work practice allowed researchers to obtain
perspectives on safety practices that exist within
community pharmacies that are diﬃcult to obtain
with other methods; when people are asked to
describework practice in surveys interviews or focus
groups, they often leave out the small ‘irrelevant’
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practices. Findings from this study could be used to
inform the design of interventions aimed at
improving safety practices in community pharma-
cies such as creating standard dynamic systems. The
study was qualitative, which limits the generaliz-
ability of the ﬁndings. The results provide only a
snapshot of community pharmacy safety issues,
some of which might not be widely prevalent. It
must also be noted that the data for this study was a
result of an ethnographically-informed e-health
study, therefore, it is possible that other key factors
were overlooked during the data collection.
Conclusion
Dispensing journeys of prescriptions rely on
teams of people, processes, workloads, protocols,
pharmacy resources, organizational systems, tech-
nical systems and space. Through this complex
practice, it was diﬃcult to ascertain whether
sources of risk were down to peoples’ unsafe acts
or unfavorable working conditions as both sources
were inextricably linked. What was clear, however,
was how the relationships between the teams of
people and other components are important in
dispensing safely. This is because riskwas identiﬁed
when people did not interact well with other
components, which meant that they dispensed
prescriptions with divided attention, under pressure,
in restricted spaces and having tomanage risk from
external sources such as prescriber mistakes. In
conclusion, it is suggested that pharmacies reﬂect
on the organization of their systems and review in
particular how they can improve on the four key
categories identiﬁed in this study.
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